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ABSTRACT 
The analysis finds that if high industrial prices for electricity induce 
industrial customers to leave the regulated grid for self-generation or 
contracts with IPPs, this raises rates for those remaining on the system and 
reduces quantities purchased. It is assumed that lower industrial sector rates, 
such as those associated with a competitive electricity industry, will 
effectively eliminate defections. 
A switch to a more efficient two-part tariff, which can be expected to 
occur in a competitive electricity market, has the effect of increasing sales of 
electricity in all sectors while still raising needed revenues. Such a price 
structure is also found to lower the average price of electricity in each sector. 
An efficient two-part tariff is also likely to shift revenue responsibilities to 
immobile residential and commercial customers. This would occur because 
industrial customers shift demand by defection in response to average price 
changes, but residential and commercial demand is inelastic to customer 
charges. 
If prices are efficient, strandable cost allocations only have a minor 
effect on electricity demand because strandable cost payments are raised via a 
customer charge. If strandable costs are recovered by a wires charge (e.g. 
higher prices),however, there will be negative demand effects. Strandable 
costs significantly affect the average price of electricity and the average 
monthly bill in either case. Their allocation is important for equity reasons, as 
is the method of collection in determining the levels of sales. 
Removing strandable costs lowers the average price of electricity in 
each sector and increases demand. Lowering strandable costs is the only 
option which clearly benefits all sectors. 
• 
Competitive Electricity Markets in New York State: 
Empi,rical Impacts of Industry Restructuring 
R. Ethier and T. D. Mount 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Much qualitative work has been done on evaluating the impacts of 
competition on the electric industry of New York State, with most observers 
asserting that it will benefit consumers by lowering prices (The New York Times, 
March 30)995; Staff Position Paper 1995; Recommended Decision 1995). As yet, there 
are few empirical estimates of these effects, even though quantitative estimates are 
necessary for informed public policy decision making. 
Likewise, industrial defections, where industrial customers, in response to 
high prices, leave the regulated utility system for self-generation or Independent 
Power Producer (IPP) contracts are similarly in need of empirical attention. 
Industrial sector defections are important because they are one of the justifications 
for moving to a competitive system. 
Two features of competition are considered which differ from the current 
world of regulated electricity generation and delivery: efficient price structures and 
strategies for paying for stranded assets. The current electric industry price structures 
and the mechanisms for recovering the costs of capital investments have developed 
under government-sanctioned monopoly and regulation. A competitive market 
requires a rethinking of both issues. How should electricity be priced in a 
competitive world? And what is to be done with the regulated utilities and their 
(possibly uneconomic) assets? These questions can be illuminated by economic 
theory and empirical evidence. 
Of course there are a large number of other important issues which will 
determine the success of a move to competition. For example, system reliability, 
monopoly power, and social programs all need to be considered. Nevertheless, the 
implications of revised pricing schemes and strategies for re-allocating existing costs 
of stranded assets are still unexplored and they promise to be far-reaching. 
• 
The analysis finds that if high industrial prices for electricity induce industrial 
customers to leave the regulated grid for self-generation or contracts with IPPs" this 
raises rates for those remaining on the system and reduces quantities purchased. It is 
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assumed that lower industrial sector rates, such as those associated with a 
competitive electricity inc:Iustry, will effectively eliminate defections. 
A switch to a more efficient two-part tariff, which can be expected to occur in a 
competitive electricity market, has the effect of increasing sales of electricity in all 
sectors while still raising needed revenues. Such a price structure is also found to 
lower the average price of electricity in each sector. An efficient two-part tariff is also 
likely to shift revenue responsibilities to immobile residential and commercial 
customers. This would occur because industrial customers shift demand by 
defection in response to average price changes, but residential and commercial 
demand is inelastic to customer charges. 
If prices are efficient, strandable cost allocations only have a minor effect on 
electricity demand because strandable cost payments are raised via a customer 
charge. If strandable costs are recovered by a wires charge (e.g. higher 
prices),however, there will be negative demand effects. Strandable costs significantly 
affect the average price of electricity and the average monthly bill in either case. 
Their allocation is important for equity reasons, as is the method of collection in 
determining the levels of sales. 
Removing strandable costs lowers the average price of electricity in each 
sector and increases demand. Lowering strandable costs is the only option which 
clearly benefits all sectors. 
2. OUTLINE 
The next section discusses efficient electricity rates. Generally, current rates 
structures are inefficient, with a mix of Ramsey pricing and multi-part tariffs. With 
a competitive industry, it is likely that there will be increased reliance on an efficient 
two-part tariff. A simple two-sector demand model is developed to illustrate the 
potential impacts of both rate restructuring and a reduction in utility ratebases due 
to disallowance of strandable costs. A two-part tariff will both increase demand and 
shift revenue collection to sectors with inelastic demand. A reduced ratebase results 
in lower average prices, but sales are not affected very much if rate structures are 
efficient. 
The current price structure and the two-part tariff are then evaluated in a • 
dynamic model of New York State electricity supply and demand. The model uses a 
complete Generalized Logit demand system coupled with a New York State e~ectric 
supply finance model. This model is used to provide forecasts of New York State 
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electricity prices and quantities under different pricing options, capital cost 
assumptions, and industr~al sector defections. 
A Base Case scenario is developed to show model properties and create a 
baseline forecast. Then an Industrial Defection scenario is run, which assumes that 
high industrial electric rates cause industrial users to either self-generate or contract 
with Independent Power Producers. This is compared with the Base Case scenario to 
assess the impact of industrial defections on remaining utility customers. Industrial 
defections do raise rates for the remaining customers. 
Then a Competitive scenario using a more efficient two-part tariff is 
developed, with strandable costs recovered through the customer charge. Compared 
with the Base Case, this results in greater demand and lower marginal costs. The 
Competitive scenario is then run with strandable costs recovered via a wires charge 
on transmission. This reduces demand in each sector and raises average costs for 
industrial customers while lowering them for residential customers. 
A version of the Competitive model is then run with strandable costs 
removed and no wires charge to determine the impact on prices, demand, and 
average electricity prices. All customers become unambiguously better off with 
strandable costs removed, with the residential sector receiving the largest benefit in 
terms of lower average costs. 
3. RATE RESTRUCTURING 
The advent of competitive electricity generation will bring a new pncmg 
system, one which is oriented primarily around the efficient delivery of electricity 
services. Economic theory shows that in equilibrium, long run marginal cost pricing 
is the most efficient way to allocate any commodity (Kahn, 1971, pp. 65-70). It 
maximizes consumer and producer surplus while ensuring that each user pays the 
cost which their extra unit of consumption imposes on the system. Any departure 
from marginal cost pricing will result in a less efficient provision of services. 
Prices above marginal. cost lead to too little consumption, in that there is 
consumer surplUS to be gained by lowering the price. Any price below marginal cost 
would result in a greater than socially optimal level of consumption. A move 
toward an economically efficient pricing system would result in prices which are • 
quite different from the ones in use today, and would also lead to very different 
equity characteristics. 
4 
In the case of electricity, however, this simple economic story is complicated 
by the fact that currently)ong run marginal costs are lower than average total costs. 
Long run marginal cost pricing raises some revenue, but not enough to cover all 
costs. If these additional costs are legitimate, they must be covered by some pricing 
mechanism. In regulated industries, regulatory economists have devised ways of 
raising additional revenue with minimum losses in efficiency. These mechanisms 
could also be used in a partially deregulated industry (e.g. competition among 
sources of generation with regulated distribution). 
3.1 RAMSEY PRICING 
One such method is Ramsey pricing, which determines optimum departures 
from marginal cost pricing, thus providing increased revenues in an economically 
efficient way. It is so named because it was first outlined by Frank Ramsey in a 1927 
article on optimal taxation. It was further developed by Hicks (1947), Hotelling 
(1938), Pigou (1947), and Samuelson (1951). Baumol and Bradford (1970) provide a 
thorough description of its history. 
The intuitive rationale for Ramsey pricing is that "the damage to welfare 
resulting from departures from marginal cost pricing will be minimized if the 
relative quantities of the various goods sold are kept unchanged from their 
marginal cost pricing proportions." (Baumol and Bradford, 1970, p. 271). That is, 
consumption of each good must decrease by the same percentage. 
To achieve this, prices must rise most for those consumers with relatively 
inelastic demand and least for consumers with relatively elastic demand. In the 
extreme, those customers with perfectly inelastic demand provide all of the 
revenues required above marginal unit costs. Baumol and Bradford give a variety of 
equivalent mathematical formulations of the Ramsey price calculation. 
The practical problem with this solution is the large difference between 
residential and industrial elasticities of demand. Generally, industrial users have a 
higher price elasticity, as they have greater opportunities to substitute other energy 
sources or to find more efficient supplies of electricity. This includes the option of 
self-generation. Residential customers have much less flexibility in substituting for 
electricity use, and thus are less able to respond to price changes. • 
The logic of Ramsey pricing is such that an industrial consumer with an 
elastic demand for electricity will pay a lower marginal price than a residential 
customer who has inelastic demand. This, when coupled with price differences due 
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to different costs of service (e.g. local distribution costs are not incurred by industrial 
customers), portends large price differentials between sectors. 
3.2. THE TWO-PART TARIFF 
A powerful and potentially more efficient alternative to Ramsey pricing is the 
two-part tariff. In this case, each unit of the good is priced at marginal cost, but the 
buyer must first pay a fixed fee or customer charge to be allowed to purchase the 
good. The customer charge is set so that the sum is sufficient to cover the difference 
between average and long run marginal costs. Optimal two-part tariffs for a 
monopoly are described by Walter Oi (1971). Brown and Sibley (1986) provide a 
comprehensive treatment of both two-part tariffs and Ramsey pricing. 
If it can be implemented, the two-part tariff provides a great deal of flexibility. 
But a two-part tariff can work only when resale of the commodity is effectively 
impractical. Electricity satisfies this condition. It is generally not feasible for an 
electricity customer to resell to another consumer. Under this condition, a two-part 
tariff is preferable to Ramsey pricing. 
The two-part tariff provides a less distorting and more efficient method of 
revenue collection than Ramsey pricing. This is because customer charges can be 
adjusted across customer classes. While all customers would pay the efficient 
marginal cost for each unit of electricity, the customer charge could differ. The 
charge would depend on the consumer's elasticity of demand for access to electricity 
services, which is significantly less elastic than demand for the marginal unit of 
electricity. So a customer charge can raise equivalent revenues more efficiently 
(with less distortion in electricity demand) than increasing marginal prices under 
Ramsey pricing. 
In theory, the customer charge can capture all of a buyer's consumer surplus, 
allowing the producer to be "a better monopolist". This is because the customer 
charge distorts purchasing decisions less than simply increasing the price of the 
commodity. Alternatively, in the context of regulating a public utility, a two-part 
tariff can be set to maximize social welfare (or aggregate consumer surplus). This 
could mean maximizing efficiency and minimizing distortions, adjusting tariffs 
across income classes to make them more equitable, or some combination of the 
• 
two. 
In important ways, the customer charge can be viewed as a lump' sum tax. 
And while a lump sum tax is efficient in that it does not tend to distort consumer 
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behavior, it has the potential to create inequities. One of the biggest challenges will 
be to design an efficient pricing system which retains an equity component. 
3.3. SECTORAL INEQUITIES 
It is likely that residential electricity customers, who have no alternative 
options for buying electricity, have a relatively inelastic demand for electricity 
services. They are willing to pay a lot for access to the grid. Industrial customers are 
likely to have a much more elastic demand for access to the grid. They have the 
option of self-generation or, as seems increasingly plausible, of contracting directly 
with a non-utility generator. 
A high customer charge to industrial customers will raise their average costs 
and tend to drive them off the system. The average cost of electricity matters when 
there are options to choose among. While residential and commercial customers are 
likely to be sensitive to the average cost of electricity, they are not able to shift 
demand with current technology in the same way as industrial customers. Thus 
industrial demand is likely to be much more price elastic than residential or 
commercial demand. 
Combining these observations with the logic of Ramsey pricing and the 
feasibility of a two-part tariff for electricity services portends high customer charges 
for residential users and relatively low customer charges for industrial users. With 
efficient pricing, residential and commercial customers will bear the brunt of the 
costs above long run marginal cost, and thus pay a higher proportion of their bill in 
the form of customer charges. Combined with the inherently higher cost of service 
for residential and commercial customers, primarily billing overhead and local 
distribution network costs, average residential and commercial electricity prices will 
be even higher relative to industrial prices than those witnessed today. 
The reality that residential and commercial customers will bear the brunt of 
the customer charges will also create inequities within these sectors as well. When 
looked at in terms of average cost per unit of electricity, a customer charge will hit 
those who use relatively small amounts of electricity harder than those who use 
large amounts of electricity. The average price of electricity declines toward the 
marginal price as the quantity consumed increases. 
­
In theory, if each customer's utility function were known, a customer specific 
charge could be set so that dis-utility resulting from the charge was equated across all 
customers, subject to revenue constraints. Since this is unrealistic, a uniform rate 
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design will likely be used for each class of customers. When comparing a home with 
a myriad of appliances, electronics, and electric baseboard heating to that of a typical 
senior citizen, these potential inequities become apparent. While it seems unlikely 
that many residential customers will be pushed off the system by a customer charge, 
even with full strandable cost recovery, it may still be a significant amount of 
money to some customers. 
A multi-part tariff for electricity in the residential sector might be appropriate 
for a regulatory commission concerned with equity. Under a multi-part tariff, the 
customer charge is paid in steps. The largest portion is paid over the first X units of 
electricity, a smaller portion over the next Y units, until ultimately each unit is 
priced at long run marginal cost. Even a rising block rate might be appropriate for 
some customers in order to supply "lifeline" service (below or near marginal cost 
service to special, generally low-income, customer categories). In this case, a class of 
customers is allowed to pay less than long run marginal cost for the first units of 
electricity, but as consumption rises, incremental rates rise above long run marginal 
cost. Clearly, rate structures can become quite complicated for an equity minded 
regulatory commission, but an important lesson of competition is that it will be 
much harder to use utility rates to implement welfare programs than it was in a 
fully regulated environment. 
4. EFFECTS OF RATE RE-STRUCTURING: AN EXAMPLE 
The following simple numerical examples compare Ramsey pricing and a 
two-part tariff, showing that a two-part tariff results in increased demand. The 
example constructs an electric utility with one generating unit, transmission costs, 
and two classes of customers. 
A 1000Mw nuclear plant with a $5 billion capital cost (which results in fixed 
yearly capital expenditures of $459 million), $20/MWh production costs and a 0.95 
capacity factor is owned by a utility. At full capacity, the average cost (capital plus 
production costs) is $75/MWh. All other power is assumed to be purchased at 
$30/MWh. This simple model divides consumption between residential and 
industrial sectors. There is a distribution cost of $40/MWh for the residential sector 
and $20/MWh for the industrial sector. The residential sector is characterized by a 
constant price elasticity of -0.5. The industrial sector price elasticity of demand is -1. 
The number of customers in the residential sector is 1,239,240, while the industrial 
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sector has 2,974 plants. The utility's net revenues are approximately zero under each 
scenario. The results are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. 
The entire output of the nuclear plant, minus line losses, plus 7,694,102 MWh 
of replacement power, is consumed by the two sectors at initial marginal prices of 
$105/MWh and $67/MWh for the residential and industrial sectors, respectively. In 
addition, there is a small customer charge. This is a two-part tariff, but with 
inefficiently high marginal rates. The competitive rates are $70/MWh and 
$50/MWh respectively. While these marginal prices do not precisely match current 
rates, they are meant to be representative and will be called Status Quo prices. 
Table 1 shows that initial household demand is 6.38 MWh per customer per 
year, while industrial customer demand is 2,429 MWh/Yr. Average prices, 
including customer charges, are $112/MWh and $67.4/MWh, respectively. Note that 
the customer charge has no effect on electricity consumption (the income effect of 
the customer charge is zero). 
The next scenario uses Ramsey pricing with a zero customer charge. 
Residential marginal prices rise to $118/MWh, while industrial prices fall to 
$63/MWh, reflecting the Ramsey pricing adjustment for different elasticities. 
Residential demand falls to 6.02 MWh, while industrial demand rises to 2,570 
MWh. 
Demand is then calculated for a two-part tariff with marginal prices at the 
marginal cost of replacement power plus the variable distribution cost. This is 
combined with a yearly customer charge of $370 for the residential sector and zero 
for the industrial sector to balance the utility's books. (The zero customer charge for 
the industrial sector reflects that sector's higher price elasticity of participation in the 
electricity market.) As expected, Table 1 shows that demand rises sharply with the 
fall in the marginal price of electricity associated with the two-part tariff. Residential 
sector demand rises to 7.81 MWh per household per year, while industrial demand 
rises to 3255 MWh per year per industrial customer. Average cost for the residential 
sector is $5/MWh greater than the Status Quo price, while it is $17.4/MWh less for 
the industrial sector. 
The right hand side of Table 1 shows the effects of pricing on sector demand 
and revenues. Status Quo and Ramsey revenues are similar, but two-part tariff 
revenues from the residential sector rise by over $100 million. This shows the • 
effectiveness of the customer charge in raising revenue without reducing demand, 
as the two-part tariff both raises the most revenue and has the highest demand for 
the residential sector. 
Table 1. A Simple Demand Example with High Capital Costs (Dollars in Millions) 
Residential Industrial Residential 
Sector Sector Sector 
Status Quo Pricing 
Marginal Price $105/Mwh $67/Mwh Sales 7,905Gwh 
Cust. Charge $46/Yr $1000/Yr Revenues $887.0 
Quantity 6.38 Mwh/Yr 2,429 Mwh/Yr Payments· $333.7 
Ave Price Paid $112/Mwh $67.4/Mwh 
Ramsey Pricing 
Marginal Price $118/Mwh $63/Mwh Sales 7,459Gwh 
Cust. Charge SO/Yr SO/Yr Revenues $879.6 
Quantity 6.02 Mwh/Yr 2,570 Mwh/Yr Payments· $357.5 
Ave Price Paid $118/Mwh $63/Mwh 
Two-Part Tariff 
Marginal Price $70/Mwh $50/Mwh Sales 9,682 Gwh 
Cust.Charge $370/Yr SO/Yr Revenues $1,136.2 
Quantity 7.81 Mwh/Yr 3,255 Mwh/Yr Payments· $458.5 
Ave Price Paid $117/Mwh $50/Mwh 
• Payments equal Revenues minus the cost of Sales if the electricity were purchased in the spot market at $30/Mwh, and minus 
distribution costs. Payments can be interpreted as each sector's contribution to cover strandable costs. 
Industrial 
Sector 
7,224Gwh 
$487.0 
$125.8 
7,644Gwh 
$484.0 
$101.8 
9,681 Gwh 
$484.0 
$0 
Total 
15,129Gwh 
$1,374.1 
$459.5 
15,103 Gwh \0 
$1,363.6 
$459.3 
19,363Gwh 
$1,620.3 
$458.5 
I 
Table 2. A Simple Demand Example with Low Capital Costs (DoIlars in Millions) 
Residential Industrial Residential 
Sector Sector Sector 
Status Quo Pricing 
Marginal Price $95/Mwh $61/Mwh Sales 8,310Gwh 
Cust. Charge $46/Yr $l000/Yr Revenues $846.5 
Quantity 6.71 Mwh/Yr 2,668 Mwh/Yr Payments· $264.8 
Ave Price Paid $102/Mwh $61.4/Mwh 
Ramsey Pricing 
Marginal Price $l03/Mwh $6O/Mwh Sales 7,950Gwh 
Cust. Charge $O/Yr $O/Yr Revenues $825.4 
Quantity 6.41 Mwh/Yr 2,676 Mwh/Yr Payments· $268.9 
Ave Price Paid $103/Mwh $6O/Mwh 
Two-Part Tariff 
Marginal Price $70/Mwh $50/Mwh Sales 9,682Gwh 
Cust. Charge $287/Yr $O/Yr Revenues $1,033.4 
Quantity 7.81 Mwh/Yr 3,255 Mwh/Yr Payments· $355.6 
Ave Price Paid $107/Mwh $50/Mwh 
• Payments equal Revenues minus the cost of Sales if the electricity were purchased in the spot market at $30/Mwh, and minus 
distribution costs. Payments can be interpreted as each sector's contribution to cover strandable costs. 
Industrial 
Sector 
7,2935Gwh 
$487.0 
$90.3 
7,959Gwh 
$484.0 
$86.1 
9,681 Gwh 
$484.0 
$0 
Total 
16,246Gwh 
$1,333.5 
$355.0 
15,909Gwh 
$1,309.4 
$355.0 
~ 
0 
19,363 Gwh 
$1,517.4 
$355.6 
I 
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4.1. EFFECTS OF STRANDABLE COSTS
 
The above example can also show the effects of removing strandable costs 
from utility ratebases. Table 2 shows the effect on electricity prices of lowering the 
ratebase. Again, using the previous nuclear plant example, the prices required to 
cover utility costs are calculated under the Status Quo scenario, and then compared 
with the appropriate Ramsey prices and two-part tariff. But now the capital cost of 
the nuclear plant is reduced by $1 billion to simulate the effect of removing 
strandable costs from the utility's ratebase. Under Status Quo and Ramsey pricing 
the customer charges are the same in both scenarios, with only the marginal prices 
varying. With the two-part tariff, the efficient marginal prices are the same in both 
scenarios but the customer charges vary. 
Within the Low Capital Cost scenario, the revenue relationships are similar 
to those in the High Capital Cost scenario (Table 1). The interesting comparison now 
is between the High and Low Capital Cost scenarios for each pricing option. 
Unsurprisingly, lowering capital costs lowers the needed marginal prices and thus 
increases demand in the Status Quo and Ramsey examples. In the Ramsey pricing 
example, marginal prices in the residential sector fall from $118/MWh to 
$103/MWh. The quantity demanded rises to 6.41 MWh/year from 6.02 MWh/year. 
Industrial prices also fall, from $63 to $60/MWh, and demand rises to 2676 MWh 
per year from 2570 MWh. Residential prices fall more than industrial prices, as we 
would expect from the Ramsey rule. 
With the two-part tariff, marginal prices are unchanged across the High and 
Low Capital Cost scenarios, as are the quantities demanded. But the residential 
customer charge falls from $370/Yr to $287/Yr. The industrial customer charge 
remains zero. Importantly, the average price of electricity falls for each scenario as 
the ratebase is lowered. 
Table 2 also shows utility revenues and electricity demand by sector. The 
results are similar to Table 1: the two-part tariff results in both the highest revenue 
and the highest demand in each sector. Since utility revenues are set to 
approximately equal costs, revenues under each pricing option are less than those in 
the High Capital Cost scenario. 
In each case, strandable cost payments are about $100 million lower for the 
­
Low Capital Cost scenario. Reducing the utility's capital costs has direct effects on the 
cost of electricity to consumers. The amount of electricity demanded rises when the 
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marginal cost falls, but is unaffected by capital cost changes when a two-part tariff is 
used. Table 3 shows how electricity sales vary with the pricing mechanism used. 
Table 3. Total Electricity Sales Summary (GWh) 
Price High Capital Low Capital Difference 
Mechanism Costs Costs (Low - High) 
Status Quo 15,129 16,246 -1,117 
Ramsey Pricing 15,103 15,909 -806 
Two-Part Tariff 19,363 19,363 0 
These simple examples are used to illustrate the effects of two fundamental changes 
which are likely to occur in the electricity market as the industry moves toward 
competition. Both the structure of rates and the treatment of stranded costs affect the 
pattern of electricity demand and the revenue collected. More importantly, the 
effects of these two features of demand interact with each other in predictable ways. 
5. AN ANALYSIS OF NEW YORK STATE 
Changing the structure of electricity prices increases the uncertainty of 
consumer response to changes in average prices. Economic theory suggests that, as 
the marginal price drops, more is consumed, but theory can not accurately forecast 
how much more. To estimate the combined effects of a smaller ratebase and new 
price structures, a dynamic model is used to predict New York State electricity 
demand by sector. Demand is modeled as a function of lagged prices and quantities, 
as well as current period prices for electricity, substitutes, and other expenditures. 
The electricity supply component calculates electricity prices from statewide 
financial data, updating each year based on demand, fuel prices, and capital costs. 
5.1. THE DEMAND MODULE 
The Demand Module is a Generalized Logit Model estimated using pooled 
cross-section and time-series data with fixed state effects (see Dumagan and Mount 
•1991, Rothman, Hong and Mount 1993, and Weng and Mount 1996). Data from 48 
states for the years 1977-1990 were used for estimation. A system of demand 
equations was estimated for each of three demand sectors: residential, commercial, 
and industrial. 
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and the highest demand in each sector. Since utility revenues are set to 
approximately equal costs, revenues under each pricing option are less than those in 
the High Capital Cost scenario. 
In each case, strandable cost payments are about $100 million lower for the • 
Low Capital Cost scenario. Reducing the utility's capital costs has direct effects on the 
cost of electrici~y to consumers. The amount of electricity demanded rises when the 
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marginal cost falls, but is unaffected by capital cost changes when a two-part tariff is 
used. Table 3 shows how electricity sales vary with the pricing mechanism used. 
Table 3. Total Electricity Sales Summary (GWh) 
Price High Capital Low Capital Difference 
Mechanism Costs Costs (Low - High) 
Status Quo 15,129 16,246 -1,117 
Ramsey Pricing 15,103 15,909 -806 
Two-Part Tariff 19,363 19,363 0 
These simple examples are used to illustrate the effects of two fundamental changes 
which are likely to occur in the electricity market as the industry moves toward 
competition. Both the structure of rates and the treatment of stranded costs affect the 
pattern of electricity demand and the revenue collected. More importantly, the 
effects of these two features of demand interact with each other in predictable ways. 
5. AN ANALYSIS OF NEW YORK STATE 
Changing the structure of electricity prices increases the uncertainty of 
consumer response to changes in average prices. Economic theory suggests that, as 
the marginal price drops, more is consumed, but theory can not accurately forecast 
how much more. To estimate the combined effects of a smaller ratebase and new 
price structures, a dynamic model is used to predict New York State electricity 
demand by sector. Demand is modeled as a function of lagged prices and quantities, 
as well as current period prices for electricity, substitutes, and other expenditures. 
The electricity supply component calculates electricity prices from statewide 
financial data, updating each year based on demand, fuel prices, and capital costs. 
5.1. THE DEMAND MODULE 
The Demand Module is a Generalized Logit Model estimated using pooled 
cross-section and time-series data with fixed state effects (see Dumagan and Mount 
1991, Rothman, Hong and Mount 1993, and Weng and Mount 1996). Data from 48 ­
states for the years 1977-1990 were used for estimation. A system of demand 
equations was estimated for each of three demand sectors: residential, commercial, 
and industrial. 
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Demand relationships were estimated for electricity, natural gas, oil and other 
expenditures in the resid,ential model. In the commercial sector, other was divided 
into labor and capital expenditures. In the industrial model, coal was also added. 
Expenditure shares for each category are estimated as a function of lagged 
expenditure shares and current period prices, as well as data for heating and cooling 
degrees days. A standard geometric lag structure for quantities demanded was also 
included in the demand equations. The demand equations appear in the Appendix. 
Data on energy quantity by source and consumption sector is from the US 
Department of Energy (DOE) State Energy Data System (SEDS), Consumption 
Estimates for States, 1970-1991. Energy prices and expenditures are from US DOE 
State Energy Price and Expenditure Data System (SEPEDS), 1970-1991. Capital 
quantity information was taken from US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Gross 
State Product Files for 1977-1990. Employment information is from Full and Part­
Time Employees by Industry for States, BEA, 1967-1994. Income and industry 
earnings are from Personal Income by Major Source and Earnings by Industry for 
States, 1969-1995, also collected by the US BEA. 
Numerous desirable theoretic constraints were included in the estimation of 
the model, primarily that the underlying cost function and demand equations are 
linear homogeneous in prices and income, with a symmetric Hicksian matrix of 
partial derivatives at every data point. This symmetry implies that an underlying 
expenditure or utility function could in principle generate the Generalized Logit 
Model (Dumagan and Mount 1991, p. 9). The model was estimated using the 
Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regression (ITSUR) estimator which is part of the 
econometrics component of SAS. 
The model's demand parameters are difficult to interpret because of the 
dynamic theta weights which change with expenditure shares. More relevant 
measures of the model's characteristics are the empirical elasticities, provided in the 
Appendix. The short-run own price elasticities of electricity are small for each sector: 
-0.042 for the residential sector, -0.151 for the commercial sector, and -0.261 for the 
industrial sector. But the long-run elasticities are significantly higher, with a rise to 
-0.332 in the residential sector, -0.582 in the commercial sector, and -0.653 in the 
industrial sector. These numbers are in accord with historical estimates of electricity 
elasticity. The remaining own price elasticities each have the expected negative sign, • 
while the cross-price elasticities are generally small. 
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5.2. ELECTRIC UTILITY COST MODULE 
To create a dynamic electricity model, an electric utility Cost Module was 
constructed to compute statewide electricity prices endogenously. Utility costs, like 
electricity demand, are aggregated to the state level. Dynamics within the model are 
generated by energy input price and demand changes. The prices of all goods other 
than electricity are provided exogenously. 
The basic model inputs come from state level aggregate financial data for the 
New York State electric utilities, contained in Financial Statistics of the Major 
Investor-Owned Utilities in New York State (1994). These include existing 
generation, transmission, and distribution plant capital costs, yearly Operations and 
Maintenance (O&M) expenditures, generating capacity, and NUG purchases. 
Financial information such as debt/equity split, tax payments, and allowed return 
on capital is also used. Much of the background for the Cost Module is derived from 
US EPA CCMU Documentation (1984), Cole (1986), Reeser (1984), and Chapman 
(1982). 
Endogenous electricity prices and quantities are computed by using current 
year demand by sector as calculated in the Demand Module to calculate allowed and 
needed revenues in the Cost Module. Next year's prices are then calculated so as to 
satisfy revenue requirements at current demand. These prices are then input into 
the Demand module to calculate next period quantities. For further explanation of 
the Demand and Cost Modules, input values, as well as more detailed model 
dynamics, see Ethier (1996). 
5.3. CUSTOMER DEFECTIONS 
The residential sector is assumed to have an exogenously determined 
number of customers. They neither leave the grid in response to price rises nor join 
in response to price decreases. The same is assumed true of commercial sector 
customers. They may substitute oil heat for electric heat in response to a rise in the 
price of electricity, but they will not leave the electric grid for an alternative 
electricity provider. 
Such an assumption is more difficult to make for the industrial sector. While • 
there is little evidence that electricity prices are a significant factor in industry 
relocation (Bartik 1985), certainly it is a factor in industry decisions to seek 
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alternative electricity sources. These alternative sources include self-generation and 
direct contracting with independent electricity generators. 
Defection is addressed in the model via an endogenously computed 
industrial sector defection factor. This causes a decrease in industrial sector demand 
as a function of rising industrial electricity prices. The rationale is that as electricity 
prices rise above true marginal costs, industrial sector customers are increasingly 
likely to leave the system. Importantly, there are no second-order effects. That is, 
industrial users may leave the grid, but they do not leave the state and thus they do 
not affect employment or income in the state. They also continue to be included in 
the industrial demand for natural gas, oil, coal, capital and labor. 
The equation used for defection is: 
selCgen (t) = a*A*(~*ln(Marg_Cost(t))-ln(Price(t))) + (I-A)*seICgen (t-l) + c ; 
where industrial sector demand and customer charges are lowered each period by 
the factor "exp(seICgen(t))." In year zero, self-gen (0) = O. a, A, and ~ are user 
supplied inputs which could, in theory, be estimated. In practice, accurate estimation 
is difficult with the available data. A is the proportion of defection occurring in the 
first time period. a is the long-run elasticity of defection, and ~ and c are parameters 
used to normalize the initial year to zero. 
Industrial defections are important for two reasons: 1) to the extent that they 
have occurred they may have already adversely affected residential and commercial 
rates, and 2) the specter of industrial defections has already resulted in lower average 
industrial rates and has provided the main rationalization for moving to 
competitive electricity provision. Empirical examination can inform these issues. 
6. THE BASE CASE 
An initial run called the Base Case is used as both a means to evaluate model 
performance and as a baseline against which to compare other model results. The 
Base Case uses 1994 statewide average prices for each sector and aggregate state 
quantities by sector as a calibration year. The model then iterates forward, adjusting 
prices in each sector by an equal percentage as necessary to satisfy revenue • 
requirements. The customer charge remains constant. This case assumes a 
continuation of the current regulated utility paradigm in that high marginal rates 
are charged, there are no industrial defections, and all costs are recovered. 
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Energy price forecasts are from the Annual Energy Outlook 1995 compiled by 
the Energy Information Administration (EIA). The EIA projects the real price of oil 
to increase by 2.4% per year and the real price of natural gas to increase by 3.1% per 
year until 2010. It expects the real price of coal to increase 8% by 2010. It is assumed 
that these rates of increase occur across all sectors and are constant across scenarios. 
Incidentally, the Energy Information Administration forecasts that nationwide, real 
electricity prices will stay constant or fall slightly over the next twenty years (EIA, 
1995), which is consistent with the model results. 
The marginal electricity prices generated by the model are plausible (Figure I), 
with a slight price rise in the short run, followed by a larger decline after year five. 
Quantities demanded rise slightly over time (Figure 2). Note that the price 
adjustment mechanism used by the model in this case keeps customer charges 
constant in real dollars, and also adjusts the price of electricity in each sector by the 
same proportion to generate needed revenues. 
So simply iterating the model forward without adjusting price ratios, 
customer charges, or utility parameters provides unobjectionable results. Additional 
testing has shown that the Demand Module is robust to a large range of price 
variations, and that the Cost Module adds new generation appropriately, adjusting 
prices as needed. 
7. DEFECTION SCENARIO 
An interesting empirical question is the effect of industrial sector defections 
on customers remaining on the system. The fear of industrial defection has already 
led to lower industrial rates in an effort to preempt defections, and has also 
provided an argument for the move to competition. It has become increasingly clear 
that even with falling industrial rates, the regulated utility model is untenable in an 
era of falling marginal costs of electricity (Bayless, 1994). 
The dynamic mo'del makes it possible to determine how the effects of 
industrial defections evolve, by comparing results with the Base Case with no 
defections. (Table 4 summarizes the assumptions of each of the scenarios.) The 
expectation is that the more industrial customers leave the system, the higher rates 
•become for the remaining customers. This in turn has two second order impacts: 
increased rates induce further shifts of industrial customers and higher rates lead to 
reduced demand in other sectors, so that fixed costs must be spread among fewer 
units of electricity, further raising rates. 
17 
Figure 1.. Base Case Electricity Prices by Sector 
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Figure 2. lJase Case Electricity Demand by Sector 
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Table 4. Scenario Outlines 
Scenario Initial Year Industrial Ratebase Price Adjustment 
Values Defection Rate Used Mechanism** 
Base Case 1994 Base Year* o High Adjust Marginal Price; 
Fixed Cust. Charge 
Industrial Defection 1994 Base Year Endogenous High Adjust Marginal Price; 
Fixed Cust. Charge 
Competitive 1994 Base Year o High Marginal Price = ~ 
Marginal Cost; \0 
Adjustable Cust. Chg. 
Wires Charge 1994 Base Year o High Marginal Price = 
Marg. Cost + Wires Charge; 
Adjustable Cust. Chg. 
Low Strandable Costs 1994 Base Year o Low Marginal Price = 
Marginal Cost; 
Adjustable Cust. Chg. 
*Base Year values are provided in Ethier (1996). 
U In each scenario, Adjusted values are changed so as to generate Allowed Revenues at current demand.
 
For Competitive, Wires Charge, and Low Strandable Cost scenarios, marginal prices are a function of marginal cost.
 
I 
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A comparison of the Base Case scenario with a scenario involving defections 
(Figure 3) supports the expectation of higher rates for remaining customers. The 
final year residential price under the Defection scenario is $132.51/MWh, 
$12.24/MWh higher than the Base Case final year. (Table 5 summarizes the start 
year and final years of each scenario, as well as providing the average cost of 
electricity.) The average residential price is $12.49/MWh higher. Commercial sector 
prices are also higher under the Defection scenario. 
Demand also falls in each sector, as shown in Figure 4. Note that industrial 
sector demand falls dramatically. This shows industrial customers leaving the grid 
for self-generation or NUG contracts. The model levels off with just under 40% of 
the initial industrial customers defecting. This may be a large amount of defections, 
but the reality is that there is no way to know how many industrial customers 
would have opted out of the traditional utility system. It seems likely that the 
number would be significant. The effect on remaining customers is likely to be 
proportional to the number of defections. 
8. COMPETITIVE PRICING 
Another scenario of interest is the effect of moving to a more efficient two­
part tariff. As discussed above, there is likely to be increased use of the two-part tariff 
under a system of competitive electricity provision. The Competitive scenario uses a 
nearly efficient two-part tariff where the marginal prices are close to the long run 
marginal costs of production and distribution, while the customer charge varies to 
generate revenues which cover the remaining fixed costs. This scenario could be 
thought of as a competitive generation system coupled with a regulated 
transmission system, where marginal prices are driven to the efficient level. Retail 
service might or might not be competitive. The variable customer charge reflects a 
transmission access fee charged to each customer to cover fixed distribution and 
transmission expenses as well as strandable costs. 
Figure 5 shows the price of electricity for the residential and industrial sectors 
under a Competitive scenario and under the Base Case scenario. As Figure 5 shows, 
the marginal price of electricity is lower for each sector under Competitive pricing. 
Figure 6 shows that the resultant quantities demanded rise with lower marginal • 
prices. So the dynamic model indeed shows that using a more efficient two-part 
tariff increases demand over a revenue-equivalent set of pseudo-Ramsey prices. 
--<>---0--0­
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Figure 3. Defection versus Base Case Electricity Prices 
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Table 5. Scenario Summaries by Sector: Electricity Prices, Quantities, and Customer Charges 
Marginal 
Prices ($/MWh) 
Residential 
Commercial 
Industrial 
Start Year 
$123.37 
$107.74 
$67.04 
Base Case 
Final Year 
$120.27 
$105.05 
$65.34 
Defection 
Final Year 
$132.51 
$115.73 
$71.99 
Competitive 
Final Year 
$95.12 
$91.85 
$60.49 
Wires Charge 
Final Year 
$98.53 
$95.12 
$65.44 
Low Strandable 
Costs 
Final Year 
$95.09 
$91.81 
$60.49 
Quantities (GWh) 
Residential 
Commercial 
Industrial 
Totals 
38,396 
60,086 
35,172 
133,654 
39,246 
60,320 
35,348 
134,914 
38,103 
57,301 
19,960 
115,364 
43,086 
64,922 
37,517 
145,524 
42,587 
63,808 
35,641 
142,036 
43,115 
64,922 
37,517 
145,553 
N 
N 
Customer Charge ($/Yr) 
Residential 
Commercial 
Industrial 
$50.00 
$250.00 
$1,200.00 
$50.00 
$250.00 
$1,200.00 
$50.00 
$250.00 
$1,200.00 
$213.92 
$1,069.58 
$5,133.97 
$136.76 
$683.82 
$3,282.35 
$99.44 
$497.22 
$2,386.64 
Average Price ($/MWh) 
Residential 
Commercial 
Industrial 
$131.55 
$111.18 
$67.54 
$128.27 
$108.47 
$65.83 
$140.76 
$119.33 
$72.86 
$126.30 
$105.46 
$62.47 
$118.70 
$103.97 
$66.77 
$109.57 
$98.14 
$61.41 
I 
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Figure 4. Defe,ction vs. Base Case Quantities of Electricity
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Figure 5. Marginal Electricity Prices by Sector: Base Case vs.
 
Competition
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Figure 6. Electricity Quantity by Sector: Base Case vs.
 
Competition
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In the first year, residential prices are $127.291 MWh for the Base Case, while 
the are $88.81/MWh for the Competitive case. Industrial sector prices fall less, from 
$68.541 MWh to $55.101 MWh, because they start closer to marginal cost. In the final 
year, residential prices are $95.12 vs. $120.271 MWh, while industrial prices are 
$60.49 vs. $65.341 MWh for Competitive and Base Case scenarios, respectively. 
Residential quantities rise from 38,396 GWh in the calibration year to 43,086 GWh 
under Competition and 39,246 GWh under the Base Case. Industrial quantities rise 
under Competitive pricing, from 35,348 GWh under the Base Case and to 37,517 
GWh. 
One important source of revenue not captured in Figure 5 is the customer 
charge. The Base Case residential customer charge is a constant $50/year per 
household, while the Competitive customer charge varies over the 20 year forecast 
period, and is much larger than the Base Case customer charge. In the first year 
under Competitive pricing, the residential customer charge rises to $364/year per 
household. It decreases to $214 in the final year of the forecast period. 
One way to combine the effects of marginal prices and customer charges is by 
calculating the average price per unit of electricity for a household under each case. 
Table 5 shows that Competitive Pricing does indeed result in lower average costs of 
electricity and higher demand. In the residential sector the average price drops from 
$128.271 MWh in the final year of the Base Case to $126.301 MWh in the final year of 
the Competitive Pricing scenario. Note that this occurs while demand increases by 
over 3,810 GWh's from the Base Case final year. 
9. STRANDABLE COST COLLECTION 
Currently, there is no clear consensus about the resolution of the strandable 
cost issue. Customers could be responsible for anything between all or none of 
calculated strandable costs. The Competitive forecast was calculated assuming that 
customers would assume responsibility for all strandable costs through the 
customer charge, which would reflect a transmission access fee. It is interesting to 
model both the impact of removing strandable cost responsibility from ratepayers 
and the effect of a wires charge instead of a fixed access fee. 
The PSC has calculated that strandable costs for nuclear plants and NUG • 
contracts could surpass $10 billion statewide (PSC opinion 1995). Using this number 
as an upper bound of strandable cost reductions, the Competitive scenario is re­
evaluated with $10 billion in strandable cost recovery via a" per MWh wires charge 
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on transmission. This mechanism has been proposed as an appropriate means for 
recovering strandable costs in a competitive market. This model run is called the 
Wires Charge scenario, and its results ought to be compared primarily with the 
Competitive scenario. 
A transmission wires charge of $6.80/MWh generates over $550 million/year 
under the initial year demand, and during the 20 year forecast period will 
approximately cover a $10 billion strandable cost. Since the marginal price in each 
sector is $6.80/MWh higher with the Wires Charge scenario than under the 
Competitive scenario, there are demand effects in each sector. 
As expected, the higher marginal prices which result from the imposition of 
the wires charge reduce demand and raise the average price of electricity, although 
the customer charge does fall. The Final year residential price for the Wires Charge 
scenario is $98.53/ MWh, versus $95.12 for the Competitive scenario. Final year 
demand falls from 43,086 GWh to 42,587. The average residential price actually falls, 
from $126.30 to $118.70 because the wires charge causes the industrial sector's 
average price to rise from $62.47 to $66.77. So in this case, the wires charge shifts 
some revenue responsibility from residential to industrial customers. Note that 
industrial defections do not occur with a wires charge. 
See Figures 7 and 8 for marginal prices and quantities under each scenario. 
Figure 9 shows that the needed customer charge falls with the imposition of the 
wires charge. The strandable cost payment mechanism clearly affects marginal price, 
demand, and average price in each sector. If strandable cost payments are lumped 
into customer charges, demand will be higher. Using a wires charge will lower 
demand and may also shift revenue collection across sectors. In this example, 
residential customers achieve lower average prices at the expense of industrial 
customers, who are faced with higher average prices. Commercial customers face 
slightly lower average prices with a customer charge. Of course, if industrial 
customers were able to leave the system at these higher prices, average prices would 
change. 
10. REDUCING STRANDABLE COSTS 
The last scenario examines the effects of removing strandable cost 
­
responsibility from ratepayers. It will be assumed that strandable costs are absorbed 
by either the government, utilities, IPPs, or some combination of the above. And 
while it seems likely that some portion of strandable costs will be removed from 
120 
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Figure 7. Marginal Price with and without Wires Charge 
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Figure 8. Electricity Demand With and Without Wires
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Figure 9. Residential Customer Charge: High and Low
 
Strandable Costs, with and without Wires Charge
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Figure 7 utility ratebases, the exact amount has yet to be determined. As an upper 
bound, the Low Strandable Cost scenario will look at the impact of removing all $10 
billion in PSC estimates from utilities ratebases and IPP contracts. 
The pricing mechanism used is the same as under the Competitive scenario. 
That is, marginal price is close to marginal cost of production with no wires charge, 
and the remainder of needed revenues are derived from adjustable customer 
charges. Unsurprisingly, with the small income effect from the customer charge, 
this results in marginal prices and demand which are virtually identical to those 
realized under the Competitive scenario. All of the cost reductions appear in the 
customer charge and in the calculated average price of electricity. 
Marginal prices and sector demands, since they are essentially the same as the 
Competitive scenario, are not graphed. The customer charges for the Low Strandable 
Cost scenario appears in Figure 9, where they are clearly less than the customer 
charges for either the Competitive or the Wires Charge scenarios. 
Final year average prices are calculated for the Competitive and Low 
Strandable Cost forecasts and shown in Table 5. Unsurprisingly, average costs are 
lower with Low Strandable Costs. The average cost for the residential sector in the 
final year of the Competitive run is $126.301 MWh, while it is $109.571 MWh with 
Low Strandable Costs. Industrial sector average costs also fall as strandable costs are 
removed: from $62.471 MWh to $61.41/MWh. Note that lowering strandable costs 
benefits residential customers more because they pay the bulk of the bill under the 
Competitive scenario. 
Clearly strandable cost reductions can dramatically affect customer welfare. 
Not only is an average customer's bill lowered as strandable costs are removed from 
the calculation, but when costs are recovered via a transmission tax, there are 
demand effects as well. A wires charge also has distributional effects. 
11. COMPARING AVERAGE PRICES 
One useful way of comparing scenarios is by using the average electricity 
price. The advantage of computing average prices is that they incorporate marginal 
prices, customer charges, and demand responses into one number which can be 
easily compared across sectors and scenarios. Demand effects are summarized in ­
Figure 10. 
Figure 11 shows the average price of residential electricity for each of the five 
scenarios. Unsurprisingly, of the two scenarios that assume a regulated 
145000 
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Figure 10. Total Quantity of Electricity Sales by Scenario 
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Figure 11. -Average Residential Price of Electricity
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environment, the Defection scenario results in higher average prices than does the 
Base Case. Under a competitive system, the Wires Charge scenario results in 
uniformly lower average residential prices than does the Competitive scenario 
because the wires charge shifts revenue responsibilities to the industrial sector. The 
Low Strandable Cost scenario produces the lowest average costs of any scenario. 
When using average cost as the yardstick, it is not clear that residential 
customers are better off under the Competitive scenario than under the Base Case 
because Competitive average prices are higher for the first eight years. But if the 
Defection scenario, not the Base Case, were the appropriate baseline, then the 
Competitive scenario might be preferred. However, if strandable cost recovery were 
via a wires charge, residential customers might prefer a competitive system because 
the Wires Charge scenario produces lower average costs than the Competitive 
scenario. The Wires Charge scenario might also be preferred to the Base Case 
scenario. 
The Low Ratebase scenario is the only one which clearly dominates the other 
scenarios. In every year other than year zero, the average price for the Low Ratebase 
scenario is strictly less than the average price under each of the other scenarios. 
Figure 12 shows the average industrial price of electricity for the same five 
scenarios. The scenarios three scenarios which assume a competitive pricing system 
produce lower industrial sector prices than the Base Case and Defection scenarios 
(which assume a regulated system.) Unlike the residential sector, the Low Ratebase 
scenario does not produce the lowest average costs in every year. In fact, the Low 
Ratebase scenario produces only slightly lower average prices than the other two 
Competitive scenarios. This is in contrast to the residential sector, where the Low 
Ratebase scenario produces much lower prices than the Competitive scenario. This 
reflects the fact that the residential sector, with its inelastic demand for electricity, 
pays for a large share of fixed costs, so any reduction in strandable costs benefits the 
residential sector more than the industrial sector. 
When strandable costs are recovered via a wires charge, strandable cost 
charges are spread more evenly between sectors. This can be seen in a comparison of 
the Wires Charge and Competitive scenarios. In the industrial sector, the Wires 
Charge produces uniformly higher average prices than does the Competitive 
• 
scenario, the opposite of the residential sector. This is because the wires charge shifts 
revenue collections from the residential sector to the industrial sector. 
Another means of comparing the effects of scenarios is by the ratio of average 
residential price of electricity to the average industrial price. Figure 13 shows that 
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Figure 13. Ratio of Residential to Industrial Average Prices 
26 , 
2.5 t 
I
 
I
 
2.4 T 
I
I 
I 
2.3 + 
i
! 
I 
2.2 + 
" IC I 
'5i ! 
ell i 
a: 2.1 ! 
.2 i 
ca ! 
a: i 
I 
!
 
2 ~
 
: 
I 
1.9 ~. 
I 
I 
: 
I 
: 
1.8 i 
I
I 
i1.7 + 
I 
1.6 .J--f--f--""""'I--+--f---!---i--+--f-"'"'"'"i--+--+--+-I--11--+1--+1--+-1--+---+1----1I	 
... 
o	 N M v ~ ~ ~ ~ m 0 N M v ~ ~ ~ ~ m 0 
N 
Year 
1-0-Base Case -<>- Defections --A- Competitive -X-Wires Charge -*-low Ratebase 1 
37
 
this ratio varies greatly both across scenarios and over time within scenarios. For the 
first ten years of the forecast period, the Base Case and Defection scenarios produce 
relatively stable ratios. Each of the three scenarios under competition produces more 
unequal price ratios than the two scenarios which assume a regulated environment. 
This is not surprising, because equity concerns are a central part of the regulatory 
process but they are much less important in a competitive pricing environment. 
But interestingly, after about the tenth year of the forecast period, the Wires 
Charge and Low Ratebase scenarios produce more equal average prices than the 
regulated scenarios as capital costs recovered through the customer charge begin to 
decline. The Competitive scenario always results in more unequal pricing. 
Comparing average prices can quickly show the equity impacts of different 
pricing and strandable cost options. The Defection scenario is clearly worse than the 
Base Case projection in each sector. In contrast, the Competitive scenario and the 
Wires Charge scenario have different revenue implications for the residential and 
industrial sectors. The Low Ratebase scenario benefits each sector. 
12. CONCLUSIONS 
Competition is likely to show that the current rates charged for electricity, 
while satisfactory in a regulated environment, are untenable in a world with many 
new players unless there is a high level of direct state involvement. Consumers are 
still likely to be concerned about reducing average prices, with a two-part tariff being 
the most efficient way of generating revenue while keeping the average price low. 
Existing electricity rates combine Ramsey-type marginal prices with moderate 
customer charges. In general, when a two-part tariff is feasible, Ramsey pricing is not 
desirable. It is less efficient than an efficient two-part tariff at generating needed 
revenues without distorting demand. As Table 1 shows, Ramsey pricing results in 
higher average costs as fixed costs are spread across fewer units of electricity. In a 
competitive setting, Ramsey pricing would surely give way to more efficient unit 
pricing as suppliers undercut one another's marginal prices. This would produce the 
lowest average costs as well. But in a regulated setting, equity concerns have helped 
• 
to prevent the use of an efficient two-part tariff. 
The potential of two-part tariffs to generate additional revenue is great. Since 
residential and commercial demand is essentially unchanged by the size of the 
! 
'-----~----------------------'! 
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customer charge, large fixed costs can be recovered without losing the efficiency 
characteristics of having marginal price equal marginal cost. With a two-part tariff, 
average residential sector rates can be raised even as electricity demand increases, 
which is not true under strict Ramsey pricing. Of course, customers who use little 
electricity may be faced with unacceptably high average costs of electricity. 
Two-part tariffs are less effective for customers who are sensitive to average 
electricity costs because they have access to other sources of electricity. Industrial 
customers are likely to be able to either contract with NUGs or employ self­
generation. This is made possible by modern, moderate sized gas turbine technology. 
The introduction of these technologically advanced low-cost sources of electricity 
has exacerbated the problem of strandable costs through the use of legislated 
contracts for NUG sources of power, and it has also provided industrial users with a 
technical means to escape paying for strandable assets. 
High costs, from nuclear plants and 6¢ power contracts with NUGs, among 
other causes, have resulted in utilities charging high rates to all customers. 
Industrial customers, having other options, have recently been able to reduce this 
burden by plausibly threatening to switch to alternative sources of electricity. To 
accommodate these industrial customers, utilities have been forced to shift cost 
responsibility toward captive residential and commercial users. The two-part tariff 
allows this to be done without lowering electricity demand as much as it would be 
lowered if marginal prices increased. 
So it is the sensitivity of industrial customers to average, not just marginal, 
electricity rates which limits the ability of the two-part tariff to collect revenues in 
this sector. This constraint is not present in the other two sectors because 
inexpensive alternative sources of electricity are not as readily available. 
The empirical analysis shows that industrial defections clearly produce higher 
rates for all remaining customers as industrial customers leave the system. To the 
extent that this is a plausible scenario, it justifies moves to keep industrial 
customers on the system. 
Competitive pricing will lower average industrial rates, reducing the 
likelihood of defections. It will also place the bulk of responsibility for strandable • 
costs on residential and commercial customers, raising their average costs. The 
imposition of a wires charge would shift some responsibility for strandable costs 
back to industrial customers. It would also reduce demand in each sector. How 
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strandable cost revenues are collected affects prices across sectors as well as sales 
within each sector. 
Removing strandable costs ensures that each sector benefits from a 
competitive system. The Low Strandable Cost scenario provides the lowest marginal 
prices, customer charges, and average price in each sector, as well as the largest 
demand. The Low Strandable Cost scenario, when compared with the Competitive 
scenario, also shows that the demand and marginal price effects of strandable costs 
are negligible when a two-part tariff is used. 
The scenarios which assume a regulatory environment produce the most 
equal average prices in the residential and industrial sector over the first half of the 
forecast period. The Competitive scenario produces highly unequal average prices. 
The Wires Charge scenario produces more equal average prices, while the Low 
Strandable Cost scenario produces the most equal average prices in the long term. 
A competitive system of electricity provision will dramatically affect rate 
structure and demand as state control over prices is reduced. To the extent that 
industrial defections reduce industrial sector demand, competitive pricing may 
benefit all sectors even if some revenues are shifted to immobile customers. But two 
facets of a competitive system over which the state will have some control, the 
means and quantity of strandable cost recovery, will also play large roles in 
determining the impact of competition on each sector. A wires charge has the 
potential to produce more equal average prices, at the expense of reduced demand, 
while removing strandable costs can make competition attractive for all sectors. 
•
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APPENDIX 
Demand Equations 
The estimated Residential Model is given in (1), where i=1 is electricity, 2 is 
natural gas, and 3 is oil. N is other, non-energy goods, s is the state, and t is the year. 
HDD is heating degree days and CDD is cooling degree days. The distributed lag 
parameter on quantities is A, while ~i is the coefficient of the Stone Price Index. The 
remaining parameters are defined as above. 
(1)	 In (:its ) = (UiOs - unOs) + ±(Uij8ij (t-I)S In P~ts) ­
nts j=l, j:t=i PitS 
I(Unj8 nj (t-l)S In Pjts) + (~i - ~n)ln It~ + A(In Xi(t-l)s - In Xn(t-l)s) 
j=l Pnts	 PIts 
= 1,2,3 
The estimated Commercial and Industrial Models are: 
Wits	 n ( Pjts ) n-l( Pjts )(2) In -- = (UiOs - unOs) + L uij8 ij(t-l)s In-.- - L U nj8 nj(t-l)s In-­( )
Wnts	 j=l PItS j=l Pnts 
• 
= 1,2,... , n - 1 
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where i=l is electricity,"2 is natural gas, 3 is oil, 4 is capital, 5 is labor in the 
commercial sector and coal in the industrial sector, while 6 is labor in the industrial 
sector only. e is defined below: 
-_ wy-lwY 
i k 
Other parameters are defined as above. 1 
I For a more detailed explication of the model and derivation of elasticities, homogeneity properties, and Hicksian 
cross-price effects, see Dumagan and Mount (April 1991). 
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MODEL ELASTICITIES 
Residential Sector 
Short Run Hicksian Price Elasticities 
Electricity 
NGas 
Oil 
Other 
Electricity 
-0.042 
0.030 
0.010 
0.000 
NGas 
0.017 
-0.118 
0.000 
0.001 
Oil 
0.003 
0.000 
-0.193 
0.001 
Other 
0.022 
0.088 
0.184 
-0.002 
Lon!: Run Hicksian Price Elasticities 
Electricity 
NGas 
Oil 
Other 
Electricity 
-0.332 
0.330 
0.233 
0.001 
NGas 
0.037 
-0.631 
0.041 
0.003 
Oil 
0.018 
0.005 
-1.011 
0.004 
Other 
0.277 
0.296 
0.737 
-0.008 
Short Run Marshallian Income & Price Elasticities 
Electricity 
NGas 
Oil 
Other 
Electricity 
-0.052 
0.020 
0.005 
-0.011 
NGas 
0.011 
-0.123 
-0.003 
-0.006 
Oil 
0.000 
-0.004 
-0.195 
-0.003 
Other 
-0.862 
-0.783 
-0.238 
-0.984 
Income 
0.903 
0.890 
0.431 
1.004 
Lon!: Run 
Electricity 
NGas 
Oil 
Other 
Marshallian Income 
Electricity 
-0.343 
0.319 
0.222 
-0.010 
& Price Elasticities 
NGas 
0.030 
-0.637 
0.035 
-0.003 
Oil 
0.014 
0.001 
-1.015 
0.000 
Other 
-0.371 
-0.036 
2.830 
-1.007 
Income 
0.670 
0.354 
-2.072 
1.020 
• 
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Industrial Sector 
Short Run Price Elasticities 
Electricity 
NGas 
Oil 
Coal 
Capital 
labor 
Electricity 
-0.261 
-0.014 
-0.009 
0.002 
0.022 
0.002 
NGas 
-0.004 
-0.371 
-0.002 
0.003 
0.012 
-0.001 
Oil 
-0.004 
-0.004 
-0.187 
0.002 
0.012 
-0.001 
Coal 
0.000 
0.001 
0.000 
-0.004 
0.003 
-0.001 
Capital 
0.215 
0.448 
0.255 
0.411 
-0.552 
0.216 
labor 
0.054 
-0.060 
-0.058 
-0.415 
0.503 
-0.215 
Long Run Price Elasticities 
Electricity 
NGas 
Oil 
Coal 
Capital 
Labor 
Electricity 
-0.653 
-0.065 
-0.016 
0.075 
0.052 
0.006 
NGas 
-0.009 
-0.938 
0.004 
0.043 
0.031 
-0.002 
Oil 
-0.003 
-0.013 
-0.451 
0.044 
0.021 
0.000 
Coal 
-0.005 
-0.002 
-0.005 
0.012 
0.000 
0.000 
Capital 
-0.239 
-0.938 
-0.256 
-0.674 
-0.121 
0.080 
Labor 
0.909 
1.955 
0.724 
0.500 
0.017 
-0.085 
Commercial Sector 
Short Run Price Elasticities 
Electricity 
NGas 
Coal & Oil 
Capital 
Labor 
Electricity 
-0.151 
0.023 
0.076 
0.013 
-0.001 
NGas 
0.004 
-0.213 
0.085 
0.002 
0.000 
Coal & Oil 
0.014 
0.079 
-0.177 
0.004 
-0.001 
Capital 
0.175 
0.167 
0.280 
-0.426 
0.123 
Labor 
-0.042 
-0.056 
-0.263 
0.407 
-0.121 
Long Run Price Elasticities 
Electricity 
NGas 
Coal & Oil 
Capital 
Labor 
Electricity 
-0.582 
0.022 
0.198 
0.123 
-0.025 
NGas 
-0.004 
-0.300 
0.246 
-0.001 
0.001 
Coal & Oil 
-0.024 
0.151 
-0.072 
0.033 
-0.010 
Capital 
-0.259 
-0.780 
-1.713 
-0.769 
0.248 
Labor 
0.869 
0.907 
1.341 
0.614 
-0.214 • 
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